Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Agbaglah, Messan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ehlers, Lars | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-11-30 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-12-22T10:42:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-12-22T10:42:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilano | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aNota di Lavoro |x2010,116 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C71 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D85 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Overlapping Coalitions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cover Function | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Symmetric Game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Network | en |
dc.title | Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 640758088 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.