Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443
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dc.contributor.authorAgbaglah, Messanen_US
dc.contributor.authorEhlers, Larsen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-22T10:42:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-22T10:42:03Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443-
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x2010,116en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOverlapping Coalitionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCover Functionen_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordSymmetric Gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworken_US
dc.titleOverlapping coalitions, bargaining and networksen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640758088en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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