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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443
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| Title: | | Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks  |
| Authors: | | Agbaglah, Messan Ehlers, Lars |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,116 |
| Abstract: | | This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. |
| Subjects: | | Overlapping Coalitions Cover Function Bargaining Symmetric Game Network |
| JEL: | | C71 C72 C78 D62 D85 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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