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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443
  
Title:Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks PDF Logo
Authors:Agbaglah, Messan
Ehlers, Lars
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,116
Abstract:This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.
Subjects:Overlapping Coalitions
Cover Function
Bargaining
Symmetric Game
Network
JEL:C71
C72
C78
D62
D85
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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