Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43413
Authors: 
Santos Villagran, Rafael José
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Economic analysis working papers 2007,13
Abstract (Translated): 
In Bogota reforms in 1991 blocked a market for buying and selling of votes. The patronage lost effectiveness, citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city demonstrated an outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and services. This story is illustrated by a new panel with data at the district and the polling station from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes preferences class of bogotanos by each of its mayors. However, the main result is the collapse caused by structural reforms. Before 1991, the most exposed areas to patronage generated a higher percentage of votes for the traditional parties and got more coverage in public services after 1991, the two relationships are no longer true. A patronage machine collapses.
JEL: 
D72
D73
E62
H11
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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