Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360 
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dc.contributor.authorParlane, Sarahen
dc.contributor.authorRousseau, Fabriceen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-16T13:35:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-16T13:35:48Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize optimal IPO design in the distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the after-market depresses the share's value to less informed investors. However, because it facilitates truthful interest report at the IPO stage it increases the expected offer price provided disadvantaged investors are sufficiently unlikely to flip their share. We compare the book-building's outcome to that of uniform price auction. The auction can enhance the expected offer price only if it systematically allocates a share to the strategic trader.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity College Dublin, UCD School of Economics |cDublinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series |xWP07/06en
dc.subject.jelG24en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInitial Public Offeringen
dc.subject.keywordBook-buildingen
dc.subject.keywordAuctionen
dc.subject.keywordInformed Tradingen
dc.subject.keywordSecondary Market and Dealer Marketen
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal IPO design with informed trading-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn550448209en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:ucn:wpaper:200706en

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