Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360
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dc.contributor.authorParlane, Sarahen_US
dc.contributor.authorRousseau, Fabriceen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-16T13:35:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-16T13:35:48Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize optimal IPO design in the distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the after-market depresses the share's value to less informed investors. However, because it facilitates truthful interest report at the IPO stage it increases the expected offer price provided disadvantaged investors are sufficiently unlikely to flip their share. We compare the book-building's outcome to that of uniform price auction. The auction can enhance the expected offer price only if it systematically allocates a share to the strategic trader.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // UCD Centre for Economic Research |x2007/06en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInitial Public Offeringen_US
dc.subject.keywordBook-buildingen_US
dc.subject.keywordAuctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformed Tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordSecondary Market and Dealer Marketen_US
dc.subject.stwWertpapieremissionen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal IPO design with informed tradingen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn550448209en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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