Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43360 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP07/06
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize optimal IPO design in the distinct adverse selection problems: one affecting the IPO stage and one arising in the after-market. Allocating shares to an investor with superior information in the after-market depresses the share's value to less informed investors. However, because it facilitates truthful interest report at the IPO stage it increases the expected offer price provided disadvantaged investors are sufficiently unlikely to flip their share. We compare the book-building's outcome to that of uniform price auction. The auction can enhance the expected offer price only if it systematically allocates a share to the strategic trader.
Schlagwörter: 
Initial Public Offering
Book-building
Auction
Informed Trading
Secondary Market and Dealer Market
JEL: 
G24
G32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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