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dc.contributor.authorHuang, Rachel J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMuermann, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorTzeng, Larry Y.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-15T09:22:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-15T09:22:39Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-60654-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43256-
dc.description.abstractWe examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is oþered but not purchased.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for Financial Studies Frankfurt, Mainen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFS Working Paper 2008/38en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRegreten_US
dc.subject.keywordInsuranceen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Risikoen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleHidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selectionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn599233354en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200838-
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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