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Title:Demutualization and enforcement incentives at self-regulatory financial exchanges PDF Logo
Authors:Reiffen, David
Robe, Michel A.
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CFS Working Paper 2008/44
Abstract:In the last few years, many of the world's largest financial exchanges have converted from mutual, not-for-profit organizations to publicly-traded, for-profit firms. In most cases, these exchanges have substantial responsibilities with respect to enforcing various regulations that protect investors from dishonest agents. We examine how the incentives to enforce such regulations change as an exchange converts from mutual to for-profit status. In contrast to oft-stated concerns, we find that, in many circumstances, an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than member) income has a greater incentive to aggressively enforce these types of regulations.
Subjects:Demutualization
Ownership Structure
Regulation of Financial Institutions
Enforcement Delegation
Customer Protection Rules
JEL:G28
D02
K23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62239
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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