Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43219 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2009/06
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration.
Schlagwörter: 
Managing Innovations
Vertical R&D
R&D Collaboration
Rent-Seeking
JEL: 
L22
L24
O31
O32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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