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Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43219
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| Title: | | The design of vertical R&D collaborations  |
| Authors: | | Herbst, Patrick Walz, Uwe |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CFS Working Paper 2009/06 |
| Abstract: | | Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration. |
| Subjects: | | Managing Innovations Vertical R&D R&D Collaboration Rent-Seeking |
| JEL: | | L22 L24 O31 O32 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.
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