Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43208
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dc.contributor.authorLaux, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-15T09:21:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-15T09:21:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43208-
dc.description.abstractThe paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGoethe University, Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFS Working Paper |x2008/54en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMultiline Insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordUmbrella Policiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntegrated Risk Managementen_US
dc.subject.keywordDeductible Insuranceen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikomanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebswirtschaftliches Zielen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCorporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazarden_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn606208402en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfswop:200854-

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