Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43208
Authors: 
Laux, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CFS Working Paper 2008/54
Abstract: 
The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.
Subjects: 
Multiline Insurance
Umbrella Policies
Integrated Risk Management
Deductible Insurance
JEL: 
G22
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
308.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.