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Title:Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard PDF Logo
Authors:Laux, Christian
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:CFS Working Paper 2008/54
Abstract:The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.
Subjects:Multiline Insurance
Umbrella Policies
Integrated Risk Management
Deductible Insurance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62339
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.

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