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CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M. >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43208
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| Title: | | Corporate insurance design with multiple risks and moral hazard  |
| Authors: | | Laux, Christian |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CFS Working Paper 2008/54 |
| Abstract: | | The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm's risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm's objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting. |
| Subjects: | | Multiline Insurance Umbrella Policies Integrated Risk Management Deductible Insurance |
| JEL: | | G22 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CFS Working Paper Series, Universität Frankfurt a. M.
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