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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/42227
  
Title:Airline alliances, antitrust immunity and market foreclosure PDF Logo
Authors:Bilotkach, Volodymyr
Hüschelrath, Kai
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 10-083
Abstract:This paper examines the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping the data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on nonstop routes on the transatlantic airline market with the information on dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence consistent with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the carriers outside of the partnership at respective hub airports. When an airline partnership is granted antitrust immunity, airlines outside this partnership end up reducing their traffic to the partner airlines' hub airports by 2.6-8.5 percent (depending on the specification and estimation technique involved). Our results suggest ambiguous welfare effects of antitrust immunity on some markets, where previous studies indicated airline consolidation should benefit consumers.
Subjects:air transportation
alliances
antitrust immunity
foreclosure
JEL:L41
L93
K21
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

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