Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/42221 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 10-085
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the construction of social preferences in the lab. Experimental subjects have the opportunity to donate to a charity and to allocate money in a conventional dictator game. The results show that charitable donations and dictator game allocations are positively correlated. The correlation is only significant, however, if the dictator game follows the donation decision. Furthermore, while donation behavior is independent from the order of play, dictator game behavior is not. In line with the constructive-preference approach, we argue that preferences are instable and sensitive to outside influences when subjects are confronted with a new decision situation, while in a well-known situation preferences are more stable.
Schlagwörter: 
social preferences
charitable donations
dictator game
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C93
D01
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
279.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.