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| Title: | | Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework  |
| Authors: | | Hüschelrath, Kai Weigand, Jürgen |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | ZEW Discussion Papers 10-082 |
| Abstract: | | The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent. |
| Subjects: | | competition policy monopolisation predation enforcement |
| JEL: | | K21 L41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW ZEW Discussion Papers
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