Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/42216
Authors: 
Hüschelrath, Kai
Weigand, Jürgen
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 10-082
Abstract: 
The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.
Subjects: 
competition policy
monopolisation
predation
enforcement
JEL: 
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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