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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41640
  
Title:Regulatory competition and international cooperation PDF Logo
Authors:Genschel, Philipp
Plümper, Thomas
Issue Date:1997
Series/Report no.:MPIfG working paper 97/4
Abstract:Recent research has shown that regulatory competition does not necessarily lead to downward pressures on regulation, but may at times also push the level of regulation upwards. Extending David Vogel's California effect argument, this paper shows that such upward pressure may not only result directly from the dynamics of the competitive process but also from international cooperation. Evidence from two case studies on international capital market regulation is used to identify the conditions under which cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition is likely to succeed or fail. The successful multilateral standardisation of banking capital requirements in the BIS is compared to failed attempts to harmonise interest taxation across EC member states.
URL of the first edition:http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-4/wp97-4.html
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MPIfG Working Paper, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung

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