|
EconStor >
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen >
cege - Centrum für Europa-, Governance- und Entwicklungsforschung, Universität Göttingen >
cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41574
|
| | |
| Title: | | Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF conditionality?  |
| Authors: | | Dreher, Axel Sturm, Jan-Egbert Vreeland, James Raymond |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion papers // CeGE 104 |
| Abstract: | | We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council. |
| Subjects: | | IMF UN Security Council Voting Aid Conditionality |
| JEL: | | O19 O11 F35 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41574
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|