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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorKlasen, Stephanen_US
dc.contributor.authorRaymond, Jamesen_US
dc.contributor.authorWerker, Ericen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T10:26:56Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-15T10:26:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567-
dc.description.abstractAs is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCeGE Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers // CeGE 97en_US
dc.subject.jelO19en_US
dc.subject.jelO11en_US
dc.subject.jelF35en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordWorld Banken_US
dc.subject.keywordAid Effectivenessen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Influenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordUnited Nations Security Councilen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsprojekten_US
dc.subject.stwProjektbewertungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwMitgliedschaften_US
dc.subject.stwAuslandsverschuldungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleThe costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn62241495Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:97-
Appears in Collections:cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen

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