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Title:The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? PDF Logo
Authors:Dreher, Axel
Klasen, Stephan
Raymond, James
Werker, Eric
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Discussion papers // CeGE 97
Abstract:As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
Subjects:World Bank
Aid Effectiveness
Political Influence
United Nations Security Council
JEL:O19
O11
F35
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen

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