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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41421
  

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dc.contributor.authorDewenter, Ralfen_US
dc.contributor.authorKruse, Jörnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02T09:15:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-02T09:15:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-009-3en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41421-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the impact on mobile telephony diffusion patterns of the two predominant payment regimes, calling party pays (CPP) and receiving party pays (RPP), for mobile termination services. By applying instrumental variable techniques to panel data we account for a possible interdependency of penetration rates and regulatory interventions. For this purpose we use data on political and institutional factors to instrument endogenous regulatory decisions. We conclude from our empirical analysis that there is no significant impact of either RPP or CPP on penetration rates. Therefore an application of RPP in order to obviate regulation of termination fees would be feasible.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 10en_US
dc.subject.jelL1en_US
dc.subject.jelL5en_US
dc.subject.jelL96en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmobile telephony marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcalling-party-paysen_US
dc.subject.keywordmobile termination feesen_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous regulationen_US
dc.titleCalling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn638178916en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:10-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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