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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41420
  

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dc.contributor.authorInderst, Romanen_US
dc.contributor.authorWey, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02T09:15:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-02T09:15:43Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-000-0en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41420-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier's incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers' incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier 'more on his toes' and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers' alternative options.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 01en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBuyer Poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordCountervailing Poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.stwNachfragemachten_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwGegengewichtige Marktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCountervailing power and dynamic efficiencyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn63797557Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:01-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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