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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41417
  

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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02T09:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-02T09:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-004-8en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41417-
dc.description.abstractThe hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash equilibrium. The laboratory data reported in this paper provide experimental evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Markets with a vertically integrated firm are signifiantly less competitive than those where firms are separate. While the experimental results violate the standard equilibrium notion, they are consistent with the quantalresponse generalization of Nash equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 05en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC90en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen_US
dc.subject.keywordquantal response equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordraising rival's costsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvertical integrationen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwVertikale Konzentrationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleVertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn637981545en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:05-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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