EconStor >
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41416
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorStühmeier, Torbenen_US
dc.contributor.authorWenzel, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-02T09:15:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-02T09:15:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-001-7en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41416-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of ad-avoidance behavior in media markets. We consider a situation where viewers can avoid advertisement messages. As the media market is a two-sided market, increased ad-avoidance reduces advertisers' value of placing an ad. We contrast two financing regimes, free-to-air and pay-TV. We find that a higher viewer responsiveness to advertising decreases revenues and entry in the free-to-air regime. In contrast, in the pay-TV regime, lower income from advertisements is compensated by higher subscription income leaving revenues and the number of channels unaffected for a fixed total viewership.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE discussion paper 02en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMedia Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordAd-avoidanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordTwo-Sided Marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwFernsehwerbungen_US
dc.subject.stwMedienverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivate Fernsehanstalten_US
dc.subject.stwFernsehanstalten_US
dc.subject.stwRundfunkfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGetting beer during commercials: adverse effects of ad-avoidanceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn637977335en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:02-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
637977335.pdf586.23 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.