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dc.contributor.authorPusch, Toralfen_US
dc.contributor.authorHeise, Arneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-27T09:52:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-10-27T09:52:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41337-
dc.description.abstractIt is now a few years since the introduction of the common currency, and Europe is still experiencing high unemployment. The conventional logic attributes this problem to strong trade unions and other flaws in the labour market. This article takes a different approach. Using a game theoretic model we look at the changes that occur if trade unions and the central bank have different options to choose from in a climate of uncertainty. In a singlestage game the most probable outcome is a high unemployment rate as high as the NAIRU. However, there is also a slight chance that a central bank might take the risk associated with employment expansion (if trade unions cooperate the risk pays off). Moreover, results change dramatically if the game is repeated. This allows for effects on the trade union's reputation. It can be shown that this, in turn, improves the likelihood of employment expansion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. Wirtschaft und Politik Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesArbeitspapiere für Staatswissenschaft 31en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelE12en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelJ51en_US
dc.subject.ddc300en_US
dc.subject.keywordMonetary Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabour unionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputation buildingen_US
dc.subject.keywordemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordEMUen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwLohnpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwReputationen_US
dc.subject.stwGewerkschaften_US
dc.subject.stwVollbeschäftigungen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationsbekämpfungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleCentral banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn637036670en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:uhhafs:31-
Appears in Collections:Arbeitspapiere für Staatswissenschaften - Working Papers on Economic Governance, FB Sozialökonomie der Universität Hamburg

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