Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41088 
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorZimmer, Blandineen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23-
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-19T12:00:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-10-19T12:00:49Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41088-
dc.description.abstractThis paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |cSiegenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge |x140-10en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen
dc.subject.keywordconservatismen
dc.subject.keywordtransparency of monetary policyen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen
dc.subject.stwUngleichgewichtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCentral bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn622427253en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:sie:siegen:140-10en

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