Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41088
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorZimmer, Blandineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-19T12:00:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-10-19T12:00:49Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41088-
dc.description.abstractThis paper revisits the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss., Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |cSiegenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge // Universität Siegen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht |x140en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordconservatismen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransparency of monetary policyen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwUngleichgewichtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCentral bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn622427253en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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