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dc.contributor.authorAhlfeld, Corinnaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-18T13:08:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-10-18T13:08:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41055-
dc.description.abstractBargaining between different groups, which differ in objectives, preferences and interests, is at the core of political decision-making. Yet, it is logical to presume that negotiations involving more parties will lead to inertia and a slow pace in the legislative process. According to this hypothesis, political systems involving many veto-players such as federal countries or international organisations must be prone to a low activity. Oddly enough, a closer look on the European Unions' and Germany's legislation activity level shows that these are fairly high, although in both systems exist a considerably amount of opportunities to block or delay reforms. Decision-making in this framework is mostly brought about by side-payments, which are usually not reported to the public. This poses a question. If compensation payments are able to fuel the decision process by balancing interest and help to avoid reform deadlocks why are they frequently disguised? This paper addresses this question by suggesting that politicians do avoid openly paid compensation payments out of concerns over their reputation and that decision-making is rather a strategically action than showing majorities for a certain topic.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge // Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, Universität Göttingen 145en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcompensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlogrollingen_US
dc.subject.keywordside-paymentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Reformen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwStimmentauschen_US
dc.subject.stwKompensationslösungen_US
dc.subject.stwReputationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleReputation sells: Compensation payments in the political sphereen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn622396528en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar, Universität Göttingen

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