Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4103
Authors: 
Siebert, Horst
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1388
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes how international rules are established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and global public goods.
Subjects: 
International rules
Transaction costs
Institutional competition
Gains from cooperation
Bargaining for cooperation gains
Positive mechanisms
JEL: 
F02
P00
A12
F15
K00
N00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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