EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40681
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorİlkiliç, Rahmien_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40681-
dc.description.abstractA tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that if the value of the resource to the users is linear, then each resource exhibits an isolated problem. There exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize the efficient levels of extractions by users and outflows from sources. Again, the case of linear values can be broken down source by source. For the case of concave values, we provide a graph decomposition which divides the network into regions according to the availability of sources. Then the efficiency problem can be solved region by region.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,30en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTragedy of the Commonsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCentrality Measuresen_US
dc.subject.stwAllmenderessourceen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtstheorieen_US
dc.titleNetworks of commonsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn568789563en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
568789563.pdf581.16 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.