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dc.contributor.authorBreton, Michèleen_US
dc.contributor.authorSbragia, Luciaen_US
dc.contributor.authorZaccour, Georgesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial cooperation in an IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations where no stable agreement is feasible. When more than one possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the initial group of signatory countries and the pollution level).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Matteien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,33en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelQ53en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInternational Environmental Agreementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNon-Cooperative Dynamic Gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwGrenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDynamic models for international environment agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn568796861en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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