Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680 
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dc.contributor.authorBreton, Michèleen
dc.contributor.authorSbragia, Luciaen
dc.contributor.authorZaccour, Georgesen
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial cooperation in an IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations where no stable agreement is feasible. When more than one possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the initial group of signatory countries and the pollution level).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2008,33en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelQ53en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInternational Environmental Agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordNon-Cooperative Dynamic Gameen
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Stabilityen
dc.subject.stwGrenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastungen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDynamic models for international environment agreements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn568796861en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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