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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Breton, Michèle | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sbragia, Lucia | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Zaccour, Georges | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-06-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-09-29T08:56:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-09-29T08:56:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40680 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial cooperation in an IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations where no stable agreement is feasible. When more than one possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the initial group of signatory countries and the pollution level). | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q53 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | International Environmental Agreements | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Coalition Stability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltabkommen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verhaltensökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Dynamic models for international environment agreements | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 568796861 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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