Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40677
Authors: 
Rouvière, Elodie
Soubeyran, Raphaël
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: ETA, Economic theory and applications 2008,7
Abstract: 
This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.
Subjects: 
Collective Reputation
Entry
Minimum Quality Standard
JEL: 
L11
H41
I18
Q18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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