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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Mauleon, Ana | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vannetelbosch, Vincent | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vergote, Wouter | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2008-06-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-09-29T08:56:46Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-09-29T08:56:46Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,29 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C71 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C78 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Matching Problem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Farsighted Stability | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Core | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Matching | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 568789318 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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