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dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Anaen_US
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincenten_US
dc.contributor.authorVergote, Wouteren_US
dc.description.abstractWe adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,29en_US
dc.subject.keywordMatching Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordvon Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordFarsighted Stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleVon Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matchingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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