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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675
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| Title: | | Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching  |
| Authors: | | Mauleon, Ana Vannetelbosch, Vincent Vergote, Wouter |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,29 |
| Abstract: | | We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. |
| Subjects: | | Matching Problem von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets Farsighted Stability |
| JEL: | | C71 C78 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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