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dc.contributor.authorZhao, Jingangen
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:42Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40670-
dc.description.abstractThis paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2008,27en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Formationen
dc.subject.keywordCoreen
dc.subject.keywordMaximal Payoffen
dc.subject.keywordMinimum No-Blocking Payoffen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleThe maximal payoff and coalition formation in coalitional games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn568788915en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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