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dc.contributor.authorZhao, Jingangen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,27en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMaximal Payoffen_US
dc.subject.keywordMinimum No-Blocking Payoffen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleThe maximal payoff and coalition formation in coalitional gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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