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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40668
  
Title:On policy interactions among nations: When do cooperation and commitment matter? PDF Logo
Authors:Kempf, Hubert
von Thadden, Leopold
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,21
Abstract:This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is sufficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.
Subjects:Monetary Policy
Fiscal Regimes
JEL:E52
E63
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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