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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40663
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| Title: | | The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states  |
| Authors: | | Guerriero, Carmine |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: PRCG, Privatisation, regulation, corporate governance 2008,34 |
| Abstract: | | The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set up captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward higher powered rules are more likely the more inefficient (efficient) is the production (information-gathering) technology, the less tight is political competition and the greater are pro-consumer supervisors' incentives. This prediction is consistent with evidence based on US electric power market data. |
| Subjects: | | Incentive Schemes Accountability Rules Regulatory Capture |
| JEL: | | D73 H11 L51 K2 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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