|
EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40660
|
| | |
| Title: | | Learning form experts  |
| Authors: | | Valsecchi, Irene |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: IEM, International energy markets 2008,35 |
| Abstract: | | The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert's performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert's substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected. |
| Subjects: | | Expert Information Transmission Learning |
| JEL: | | D81 L21 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40660
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|