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dc.contributor.authorSchüle, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-24T14:42:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-24T14:42:36Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-22497en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40335-
dc.description.abstractEmpirical evidence suggests that banks often engage in refinancing of intrinsically insolvent debtors instead of writing of their non-performing loans. Such forbearance lending may induce soft budget constraints for the debtors, as it diminishes their incentives to thwart default. This paper introduces a model of coordination failure to analyze how a relationship bank affects the incidence of forbearance lending and soft budget constraints by signaling its credit decision to other creditors. We find that the relationship bank's signaling ability enhances its incentives to engage in forbearance lending and infuences the conditions under which debtors face soft budget constraints.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Tübingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesTübinger Diskussionsbeitrag 303en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination failureen_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordforbearance lendingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsoft budget constraintsen_US
dc.subject.stwKreditgeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwZahlungsunfähigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen_US
dc.subject.stwAbschreibungen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwGläubigeren_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleForbearance lending and soft budget constraints in a model of multiple heterogeneous bank financingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558780997en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuedps:303-
Appears in Collections:Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen

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