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Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Tübingen >
Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Zaby, Alexandra K. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-01-21 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.pi | | urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-42006 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze the strategic protection decision of an innovator between a patent and secrecy in a setting with horizontally differentiated products. By introducing the patenting decision into the well known circular city model, the impact of the disclosure requirement linked to a patent application as well as the problem of legally inventing around a patent can be taken into account. Asymmetry in the circular market leads to a consumer migration effect. We find that secrecy may be the innovator's profit maximizing strategy whenever the mandatory disclosure of information enhances the market entry of competitors. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Tübingen | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag 323 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L24 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O34 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | patenting decision | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | secrecy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | disclosure requirement | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | patent breadth | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | horizontal product differentiation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | circular city | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Innovation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Patent | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Geheimhaltung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Lizenzvergabe | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Produktdifferenzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Räumlicher Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Oligopol | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The propensity to patent in oligopolistic markets | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 616912684 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen
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