Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322
Authors: 
Zaby, Alexandra K.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag 323
Abstract: 
We analyze the strategic protection decision of an innovator between a patent and secrecy in a setting with horizontally differentiated products. By introducing the patenting decision into the well known circular city model, the impact of the disclosure requirement linked to a patent application as well as the problem of legally inventing around a patent can be taken into account. Asymmetry in the circular market leads to a consumer migration effect. We find that secrecy may be the innovator's profit maximizing strategy whenever the mandatory disclosure of information enhances the market entry of competitors.
Subjects: 
patenting decision
secrecy
disclosure requirement
patent breadth
horizontal product differentiation
circular city
JEL: 
L13
L24
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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