Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40303 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge No. 325
Publisher: 
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Tübingen
Abstract: 
This paper empirically investigates a firm's propensity to patent. It thereby builds on a theoretical model on a firms' patenting decision in a market with vertically differentiated products. We deduce and empirically test several hypotheses from the theoretical results regarding patenting and rival's market entry decision presented in Zaby (2009). Our main finding is that in industries which are characterized by easy-to-use knowledge spillover, the technological lead of the inventor is reduced to such an extent that the propensity to patent increases. Furthermore, the intensity of patent protection has a delaying impact on rival's market entry.
Subjects: 
patenting decision
secrecy
disclosure requirement
patent height
vertical product differentiation
JEL: 
L13
O14
O33
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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