Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40301
Authors: 
Zaby, Alexandra K.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag 296
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the patenting decision of a successful inventor in a model of dynamic technology adoption with asymmetric firms. We show that the extent of the inventor's technological headstart is decisive for his patenting behavior. The overall patenting effect consists of two parts, a protective and a disclosure effect. If the technological headstart is high the negative disclosure effect may overcompensate the positive protective effect of a patent.In this case the inventor prefers secrecy. Welfare considerations show that a patent may be socially desirable even though it delays the first adoption of a new technology.
Subjects: 
patenting decision
Secrecy
disclosure requirement
technology adoption
patent height
JEL: 
L13
O14
O33
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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