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dc.contributor.authorSchumacher, Heineren_US
dc.contributor.authorHadnes, Myriamen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T15:08:07Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T15:08:07Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40013-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a theory that explains why rational agents start to believe in a causal relationship between unrelated events. Agents send and collect messages through a communication network. If they are convinced of a relationship between two events, they send messages confirming their belief with higher probability than messages contradicting it. The network aggregates this communication bias over individuals. Therefore, agents may find a strong relationship between unrelated events even if the communication bias is very small. We apply this model to an informal economy where the fear of punishment by supernatural forces prevents agents from cheating others.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 11en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInformal Contract Enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordCommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen_US
dc.titleContract Enforcement by the Godsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654222363-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec10:11-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2010 (Hannover)

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