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dc.contributor.authorRohling, Moritzen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T15:07:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T15:07:54Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39999-
dc.description.abstractRegulating inter-country externalities, like climate change, raises various enforcement problems. It is often argued that international pricebased regulations (e.g. emission taxes) are more difficult to enforce than quantity-based regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits). In this paper, we analyze the relative performance of price-based and quantity-based instruments for cases where costs and benefits are uncertain and enforcement of quantity regimes is stricter than for price-based regimes. We show that under these conditions, instrument choice solely based on the relative slopes of the marginal costs can be inefficient. If enforcement probabilities differ, rational policy choice should also take into account the level of the marginal benefit curve, as well as institutional parameters. In contrast to earlier analyses on Prices vs. Quantities, we find that the difference in welfare for both policy instruments also depends on the variance of the marginal abatement costs. Furthermore, numerical simulations of our stylized model suggest that, for climate policies, quantity-regulations might well be preferable to price-based approaches after all.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 24en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket-based instrumentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental regulationen_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.titlePrices vs. Quantities with incomplete enforcement and different enforcement probabilitiesen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654352534-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec10:24-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2010 (Hannover)

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