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dc.contributor.authorDe Luca, Giacomoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T14:37:01Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T14:37:01Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39877-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we have investigated how the employment relationship, if it implies transfer of rents, may allow employers to control the voting behavior of their workers and lead to a strategic registration of voters. This is feasible when individual voting behavior is observable, as in open ballot elections. More easily controlled voters are more likely registered providing an even larger impact of vote controlling on election results. Making individual vote truly secret (for instance with the adoption of a secret ballot) significantly reduces this control. Moreover, we show that as long as electoral districts are heterogeneous enough, i.e. contain also free voters, any attempt to control votes on the basis of district aggregate results is bound to fail. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958.en_US
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zürich 2008 9en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelK39en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleStrategic Registration of Voters: the Chilean Caseen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654094780-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec08:9-
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2008 (Zürich)

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