Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39857
Authors: 
Bischoff, Ivo
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere 63
Abstract: 
This paper presents an experimental study on the ability of human groups to escape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change. It shows that the groups identify institutional change as a means of resolving social dilemmas and are ready to apply it even if the change requires an unanimous vote. At the same time, the groups who were given the right to change the rules performed poorer on average than the control-groups. This result stands in contradiction to elementary economic reasoning as well as the results of previous experimental studies.
Subjects: 
social dilemmas
common pool resource
laboratory experiment
group behavior
institutional choice
JEL: 
C92
D71
D62
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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