EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-10T11:58:12Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-10T11:58:12Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850-
dc.description.abstractContests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper Public Choice 3157en_US
dc.subject.jelZ13en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelN40en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordgroup-size paradoxen_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsorganisationen_US
dc.subject.stwBetrieblicher Konflikten_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environmentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn634266233en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
634266233.pdf248.66 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.