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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kolmar, Martin | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wagener, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-31 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-09-10T11:58:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-09-10T11:58:12Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39850 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive) group will optimally not implement them because they compound strength differences between groups. If both groups rein in their intra-group externalities, they are both worse off, compared to a situation with free-riding, if they are relatively similar. If they are sufficiently heterogenous, the weak group loses at the expense of the relatively strong group. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper Public Choice 3157 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Z13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | N40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | conflict | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | group-size paradox | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gruppenarbeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Arbeitsorganisation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Betrieblicher Konflikt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Inefficient group organization as optimal adaption to dominant environments | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 634266233 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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