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Title:Fixed-term and permanent employment contracts: Theory and evidence PDF Logo
Authors:Cao, Shutao
Shao, Enchuan
Silos, Pedro
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper Labour Markets 3150
Abstract:This paper constructs a theory of the coexistence of fixed-term and permanent employment contracts in an environment with ex-ante identical workers and employers. Workers under fixed-term contracts can be dismissed at no cost while permanent employees enjoy labor protection. In a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, firms find optimal to discriminate by offering some workers a fixed-term contract while offering other workers a permanent contract. Match-specific quality between a worker and a firm determines the type of contract offered. We analytically characterize the firm's hiring and firing rules. Using matched employer-employee data from Canada, we estimate the wage equations from the model. The effects of firing costs on wage inequality vary dramatically depending on whether search externalities are taken or not into account.
Subjects:employment protection
unemployment
dual labor markets
wage inequality
JEL:H29
J23
J38
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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