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dc.contributor.authorDittrich, Marcusen
dc.contributor.authorKnabe, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-10T11:58:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-10T11:58:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39843-
dc.description.abstractCommon wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages - and be harmful to employment - when bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3149en
dc.subject.jelJ38en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelJ52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinsky solutionen
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen
dc.subject.stwBeschäftigungseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn634056034en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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