Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39843
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dc.contributor.authorDittrich, Marcusen_US
dc.contributor.authorKnabe, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-10T11:58:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-10T11:58:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39843-
dc.description.abstractCommon wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages - and be harmful to employment - when bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper Labour Markets |x3149en_US
dc.subject.jelJ38en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelJ52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Smorodinsky solutionen_US
dc.subject.stwMindestlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschäftigungseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wagesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn634056034en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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